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Modern scholarship has fiercely contested the motivations of Italian rebels during 
the Social War. Generally speaking, three camps have formed concerning this issue: 
those who strictly follow the sources in arguing that the allies fought against Rome to 
obtain full citizenship under her rule, those who believe the rebels sought independence 
rather than citizenship, and those who believe that rebel actions were inspired by 
differing motivations. By building upon the scholarship of Dart and Salmon, I believe we 
will see that many of the allies were willing to fight against the empire for a place of 
privilege within it. Many Italians were unsatisfied with the vague promises the Romans 
made at the conclusion of the Social War and continued to fight in Rome’s civil wars 
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After the Hannibalic War, Italian peoples generally believed that further 
integration with Rome was desirable for political, social, and economic reasons. These 
attitudes did not change during the Social War, and concessions to the allies strengthened 
the loyalties of communities which did not rebel while weakening the position of those 
who had. Initial concessions proved to be sufficient incentive for many rebels to come 
back to the Roman fold. However, some rebels continued to resist. This latter group did 
not consist of extreme separatists as modern scholars have sometimes labeled them. 
Instead, the remaining rebels were more concerned with how much political power they 
would actually have in Rome and were wary of surrendering before their rights were 
clearly defined. The failed census of 89, the suspiciously low census of 86, and the 
ongoing controversy into which voting blocs to distribute the newly enfranchised Italians 
until a senatus consultum in 86 finally determined their placement, all serve as evidence 
that the Lex Iulia of 90 and Lex Plautia Papira of 89 alone could not secure Italian 
equality with Rome.
1
 I believe this ambiguity in allied legal status explains why some 
rebels continued to fight and even raise new forces up to 87, and any Italian violence 
against Rome after 86 was not directed against Rome itself but was instead participation 
in the civil wars between Marius and Sulla. 
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As Rome grew in power it became increasingly important for Italians to integrate 
with Rome for a variety of political, social, and economic reasons. Rome’s expansion 
generally helped bring about these changes as the peoples of the Mediterranean largely 
came to view Italians and Romans as one and the same people.
2
 Keaveney and Sherwin-
White argue that the allies’ merits entitled them to full Roman citizenship and that their 
material interests required it.
3
  
From the foundation of the city, Rome had offered its citizenship to others for 
numerous reasons. Rome’s legendary founder had offered citizenship to the outcasts of 
other communities as a means of quickly establishing a large citizen body. Likewise, 
Rome expanded its citizen base during periods of military necessity such as after the 
Battle of Cannae in 216 or as a reward to allied communities for acts of extreme loyalty. 
Manumitted slaves were also automatically enrolled as citizens in the Roman tribal 
assemblies; interestingly, Rome was the only ancient state to do this.  
The Hannibalic War marks a significant step in the evolution of Roman and 
Italian attitudes towards citizenship. In the aftermath of the Hannibalic War, old attitudes 
in which Rome was merely the foremost of several important Italian cities largely gave 
way to new attitudes in which Rome was the undisputed master of all Italy. When other 
important cities, such as Capua, defected from Rome during the Hannibalic War their 
subsequent defeat marked the end of their ambitions for Italian primacy. 
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Whether it was the seasonal cattle raids of Celt-Iberians in the west or the clash of 
phalanxes between Alexander’s successors in the east, most ancient Mediterranean 
peoples were in a near-constant state of war. Mercenaries tended to be expensive and 
only owed loyalty to a ruler’s treasure, while citizen levies were both cheaper and had a 
vested interest in the security of their state. More citizens meant more inexpensive yet 
more highly motivated soldiers. Rome’s willingness to periodically expand its citizen 
body and treat its allies generously gave it a long-term advantage over its rivals in matters 
of conquest and stability. 
Rome's Relationship to its Allies before the Hannibalic War 
The settlement of the Latin War brought three methods for consolidating Roman 
territory: partial incorporation of foreign states, planting new colonies with Roman 
citizenship, and planting new colonies without Roman citizenship.
4
 Under this structure, 
Rome controlled nearly all of peninsular Italy by 266. However, throughout the 
republican period, the ratio of Roman citizens to allies varied radically. In 343, Roman 
citizens were outnumbered by allies by about three to one, but by 338 citizens 
outnumbered the allies by more than two to one. However, by 264 the allies again 
outnumbered citizens by more than two to one, and this ratio was more or less maintained 
until the end of the Social War.
5
 Using figures for Roman and allied military forces given 
by Polybius, Afzelius adds an additional twenty percent in making his calculations for the 
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 Toynbee believes Afzelius is merely speculating, and we should 
discount the additional twenty percent.
7
 
 Rome’s Italian allies were divided into two groups: the Latins whose alliance 
with Rome was less formal yet highly favorable due to their shared culture, language, and 
religion; and the socii who were bound by formal treaties yet granted domestic 
autonomy.
8
 Rome tenaciously conquered the Italian peninsula from 341-266 and offered 
its subject peoples generous terms.
9
 Though this led to significant foreign policy 
achievements, the generosity which Rome had once extended to its allies was not fully 
appreciated until the abuses of Roman magistrates in the late republic began to be felt in 
earnest.
10
 By then, Roman officials were far less generous in offering extensions of 
citizenship. 
Before the Hannibalic War, many of Rome’s allies were content with their legal 
status within the Roman system of governance. Some allies even refused offers of Roman 
citizenship prior to Hannibal crossing the Alps. For instance, the Hernican city-states of 
Aletrium, Verulae, and Ferentinum were offered Roman citizenship when the rest of the 
Hernici rebelled in 307-6, but all three cities chose to retain their prior allied status when 
offered this reward for their loyalty.
11
 Even as late as during the Hannibalic War itself, 
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the Praenestines refused an offer of Roman citizenship as a reward for their valor.
12
 As 
David explains, choosing a Roman identity also meant devaluing a local identity, and not 
all peoples felt that the benefits of Roman citizenship were worth surrendering local 
autonomy.
13
 The loyal Hernicans’ reaction should hardly seem surprising given Rome’s 
attitude towards its Italian allies during the early republic.  
Rome was greatly concerned for its reputation among the allies during the early 
republic and tended not to meddle in local affairs unless security was at stake. For 
instance, when Rome dispatched a garrison to its allies at Rhegium in the midst of the 
war with Pyrrhus, the garrison commander, Decius, eventually decided to imitate the 
example of the Mamertines in neighboring Messana by seizing the city for himself.  
Outraged by this treachery, Rome sent another army to retake the city and restored it to 
the original inhabitants. The survivors of the treacherous garrison were publicly beaten 
and executed at Rome. “[T]he object of inflicting this punishment was to restore, so far as 
possible, the good name of Rome among the allies.”
14
 Perhaps it is no coincidence that 
Rhegium remained loyal to Rome throughout the Hannibalic War even after the majority 
of southern Italy rebelled.
15
 
Rome did not ask for wealth from its Italian allies but instead asked for a certain 
number of soldiers from each community as tribute when war came. Roman allies were 
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customarily treated as comrades when armies were mobilized. The position of the socii 
extraordinarii as Roman authorities’ bodyguards displayed the Romans’ trust in the allies 
both in terms of martial prowess and loyalty. Furthermore, allied troops ate for free in the 
Roman camp while citizens’ food was deducted from their pay, and allies received an 
equal portion of loot with the Romans.
16
 In short, there were numerous military, political, 
and financial advantages in being allied to Rome and few disadvantages before the 
Hannibalic War.  
The Hannibalic War and its aftermath 
The benefits of full Roman citizenship would not become apparent to many 
Italians until after Hannibal’s campaign through Italy. The Hannibalic War had done 
much to disrupt the status quo. As during previous rebellions against Rome, those who 
defected to Hannibal found little common cause outside of their animosity towards Rome 
and failed to mutually support each other. Those who remained loyal to Rome suffered 
no such disadvantages, and some allied communities went to extreme lengths to preserve 
Rome. However, such was the scale of the defections, the duration of the war, and the 
general loss of life that certain forces drove the peoples of Italy to homogenize in ways 
that could not have been possible before. Some of these forces were the punitive actions 
of Roman officials against secessionist allies while other contributing factors were more 
benign.  
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After the war ended in 201, Rome became distrustful of its allies and launched 
several investigations into southern Italy and even loyal Etruria for conspiracies to assist 
Hannibal.
17
 The appointment of a dictator to oversee these investigations suggested that 
even the rights of Roman citizens would be suspended in suspected parties as Rome 
sought to punish everyone who had betrayed her.
18
 The Bruttians and Lucanians had 
about half of their lands confiscated at the end of the Hannibalic War while the Picentini 
were deprived of their city entirely, and these peoples were further humiliated by being 
forced into noncombatant roles in the Roman army.
19
  
Though the communities which defected to Hannibal were immediately made 
allies again upon their surrender, a rift had grown between them and Rome. Roman 
officials after the Hannibalic War began to guard the status of citizenship with jealousy 
contrary to policy as late as 214.
20
 David is right to argue that distrust and economic 
upheaval caused by subsequent land confiscations had a direct link to the Social War, 




Nevertheless, the foundation for the Social War had been laid as many rival 
communities with separate traditions and varying ambitions were replaced by 
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communities that looked increasingly to Rome as their cultural and political head. Large 
areas of land were repopulated due to both casualties in the war itself and subsequent 
mass enslavements of rebel communities. The cultural and political landscape of Italy 
had reached a watershed. 
Though Rome and her faithful allies were the immediate beneficiaries of this 
process, former ethnic and social distinctions became increasingly blurred as new 
colonies were founded, old colonies repopulated, lands confiscated, and new roads built 
to turn nearly the entire peninsula into one vast Italian network. The end result was a 
greater cultural and political homogeneity in Italy overall with Rome as the undisputed 
master.
22
 David argues that by the outbreak of the Social War the ethnic and cultural 
distinctions in Italy had all but disappeared.
23
 This position is perhaps too extreme since 
Oscan was still the principle language of central and southern Italy at the outbreak of the 
Social War.
24
 Clearly, many differences remained between various Italian peoples during 
the first century, and these distinctions were often highly localized. However, such 
distinctions did not prevent peoples from also viewing themselves in more regional, if not 
inclusive, identities as well. 
Despite numerous differences, a new Italian and Roman identity grew out of the 
generations between the Hannibalic War and the Social War in which the two groups 
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became less distinguishable, and allegiances to local civic authorities gradually 
weakened.
25
 The fact that the allies shared military service with the Romans also played 
no small part in creating a single unified Italian culture.
26
 Allied soldiers trained at Rome 
would have come to see the city as the capital of their “country”, not unlike citizens of 
modern nation-states, in addition to learning its language and culture.
27
  
Unlike during previous centuries, in the 180s and 170s B.C., Italians and Latins 
increasingly sought citizen rights at Rome, as individuals, families, and whole 
communities. In 187, a number of Latin cities complained to the Senate that many of 
their own citizens had been illegitimately acting as Roman citizens. The subsequent 
investigation found that 12,000 Latins had been falsely added to the Roman census. Livy 
does not say why these 12,000 Latins were not allowed ius migrationis, the right to retain 
one’s level of citizenship even while living in other locations, but this falsification was 
clearly depriving allied cities of their manpower as well as their financial base.
28
 
There were ways which individuals might legally gain Roman citizenship for 
themselves and their families even if Roman officials were reluctant to offer citizenship 
on a larger scale after the Hannibalic War. Families might sell a son into slavery, have the 
owner free the slave, and thus gain Roman citizenship for the son automatically.
29
 Or 
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citizens may have legally adopted noncitizens who had no intention of leaving their own 
communities.
30
 However, these methods of gaining citizenship were merely taking 
advantage of loopholes in Roman law, and officials attempted to correct the inequitable 
distribution of manpower in 177 and 173 by returning Latins to their native communities 
and forbidding the manumission of slaves with the intent of changing their civic status.
31
  
These measures, however, were only short-term solutions which did nothing to 
address the root causes of the increasingly unequal relationship between Rome and its 
allies. Issues concerning Italian manpower and citizen status were critical during this 
particular period from 264 to 146 primarily because Rome was in a near-constant state of 
war across the whole Mediterranean. Soldiers died, became disabled, grew too old, or 
were otherwise unable to continue in their duties, and Rome’s armies needed to be 
replenished from a reliable recruitment pool. Old treaties with individual cities in which 
certain quantities of soldiers were conscripted for military duty did not reflect the current 
capabilities of those allied cities. Due to the massive redistribution of population after the 
Hannibalic War, some cities were hard pressed to meet their quotas while other cities 
could have easily provided more soldiers than their treaties required.  
By claiming Roman citizenship, a person may have advantages in negotiating 
contracts, conducting business activities, or taking a share of public distributions. But 
more importantly in this time period, Roman citizenship or citizenship in more populous 
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Italian communities would lower the odds of seeing military service in wars moving 
further from Italy in which all but the political elite had a decreasing stake.
32
 Moreover, 
in a political context, if as many as 12,000 individuals were able to fraudulently act as 
citizens out of a body of a little over 250,000 male citizens, these impersonators would 
have been a significant enough portion to potentially sway voting outcomes in the 
assemblies, assuming direct political participation was one of their goals at this time.
33
 
The two assemblies with the greatest power in the late republic were the Comitia 
Centuriata and the Comitia Tributa. The Comitia Centuriata largely voted on the election 
of senior magistrates and was divided into 193 voting blocs called centuries. Assignment 
to a century was based on wealth, and the number of voters in each individual century 
would vary widely. Each century had a single vote which was determined by a majority 
of those present while voting was taking place. The centuries subdivided the five Roman 
property classes. The censors placed all citizens into one of these five classes, except the 
poorest who were lumped together into one century as infra classem with a single vote. 
Seventy of the centuries belonged to the first property class while eighteen belonged to 
the equestrians. Voting continued from the first century to the last only until the required 
ninety-seven affirmative votes had been secured. This meant that the voting highly 
favored the upper property classes. However, competition among the elite was fierce, and 
they frequently sought the support of the lower centuries. The commoners’ votes might 
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not always be needed, but when elections were close they could ultimately decide the 
outcome. With this in mind, even a few illegal votes could theoretically alter the outcome 
of an election. 
Wiseman argues “[a]fter Marius’ reform [as consul in 107 B.C., when he 
recruited men infra classem], the enrolment in the classes was thus no longer a civic duty, 
vital to the military or financial security of the state, but almost solely a privilege” since 
the only remaining function of the classes was to determine the order in which citizens 
voted.
34
 He also believes it seems likely that the censors of the late republic would not 
wish to make their duties any more difficult by forcing immigrant citizens or proletarii to 
enroll in the centuriata since they were unlikely to vote.
35
 However, we shall see that at 
least some of the allies who fought against Rome in the Social War were very interested 
in taking full advantage of their citizen rights at the polls. 
According to Botsford, perhaps it should not surprise us that later Roman writers 
such as Gellius, citing Laelius Felix, (NA 15.27) sometimes confuse the Comitia Tributa 
with the Comitia Curiata, but even republican and Augustan writers such as Cicero, 
Sallust, and Livy were not always precise when distinguishing these two assemblies.
36
 
However, the differences between these assemblies were minimized over time and may 
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be considered the same for our purposes.
37
 Here the voters were initially distributed not 
by wealth but by location. Membership in a tribe depended upon owning property in a 
given area; but, once established, tribal allotment became hereditary and would not 
change unless a censor noticed or was informed that a specific assignment was no longer 
appropriate. By the late republic, there were four urban tribes and thirty-one rural tribes. 
Like the centuries, each tribe was given a single vote determined by a majority of those 
present at the time of voting, and voting stopped once a majority had been reached in the 
assembly. Because voters in the rural tribes had to travel long distances to reach Rome, 
lower turnout ensured that each individual vote was worth more than the thousands who 
voted in the four urban tribes. This assembly elected junior magistrates as well as the 
tribunes of the plebs, and also voted on legislation. 
The Gracchi and Drusi 
It was not just Italians who recognized the need for the allies to have a closer 
kinship with Rome; at least a few notable Romans began to think along the same lines as 
well. Tiberius Gracchus was traveling through Etruria watching foreign slaves work the 
fields as he pondered the situation of Rome’s landless poor, and his speeches concerning 
agrarian reform referred not just to the Italian countryside but to those poor soldiers who 
fought and died for Italy.
38
 Though Tiberius’ legislation was not specifically aimed at 
aiding the allies, Plutarch’s choice to include terminology such as Ἰταλία in Tiberius’ 
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speech suggests that he had the allies in mind and not just Roman citizens. Of course, this 
term may come from one or more of Plutarch’s sources, such as a speech of Tiberius 
Gracchus which may have still been extant in his day, and need not be an invention of the 
biographer. Likewise, after Marius defeated the Cimbri in 101 he was declared the 
“savior of Italy”, signifying greater Italian unity than in previous generations.
39
 Granted, 
Plutarch was writing well after the lives of the Gracchi and Marius, and he may well be 
projecting later views of relationships between Rome and its Italian allies onto his 
subjects through the usage of such language, but Italians and Roman magistrates certainly 
benefited from mutual support and courted the favor of one another in the late republic. It 
seems unlikely that savvy Roman orators desiring Italian support in this day would have 
missed the opportunity to leverage this sort of inclusive language. 
As Rome annexed territory from its neighbors, varying portions of conquered 
lands became ager publicus. Over time, the wealthy took larger portions of land than they 
were legally allowed to. This created class friction not only between the rich and 
increasingly landless poor but also between citizens and noncitizens. Though ager 
publicus gave the Roman state a continuous source of revenue, the Gracchan land 
commissioners were believed to heavily favor Roman citizens rather than act as neutral 
arbiters when disputes arose between citizens and non-citizens who might both claim 
portions of the land in question. In other instances, Roman magistrates clearly abused the 
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allies in the years leading up to the Social War through arbitrary brute force.
40
 However, 
it should also be remembered that such abuses were not condoned; and, in 149, a special 
court was established to deal with these complaints. Yet such measures also made both 
Italians and provincials even more reliant on the judgments of Roman aristocrats.
41
 
Furthermore, Roman magistrates mistreating allies not only challenged local elites but 
harmed the commoners as well.
42
 Rather than rising up against their Roman masters in a 
bid for independence, the allies decided that becoming full citizens and working within 




In the case of the Gracchan land commission, judgments favoring Roman citizens 
over the allies would consequently displace other Italians who might possess the land.
44
 
Those allies who were negatively impacted by the land commission sought out Scipio 
Aemilianus for redress, again indicating that the allies preferred to work within the 
Roman political system to solve their problems.
45
 Much to the allies’ chagrin, Scipio’s 
choice of arbiters, the consul Tuditanus, ultimately shirked this difficult responsibility, 
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preferring to fight the Illyrians instead.
46
 However, Fulvius Flaccus would soon take up 
the allied cause. 
After Tiberius Gracchus’ death in 133, Fulvius Flaccus was the first consul to 
“urge the Italians to seek to obtain Roman citizenship and emerge from the condition of 
subjects to take part in the government of the empire.”
47
 Flaccus was on the Gracchan 
land commission and was in a unique position in the Roman government to recognize the 
Italians’ plight.
48
 Flaccus would have seen the inequity between Roman citizens and the 
allies in disputes over land allotments, and granting the Italians citizenship could be seen 
as a way of allowing the commission to continue redistributing land without opposition 
from the newly enfranchised Italians.
49
 
Reception to Flaccus’ proposal to extend citizenship to the allies was mixed.
50
 
Valerius Maximus states that Flaccus added that any Italian wishing to retain their native 
citizenship with the right of appeal to the Roman people may do so.
51
 Though many 
communities would opt for Roman citizenship, some might have chosen to retain their 
former citizenship, probably because these groups still had previously established terms 
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with Rome which were still favorable at this time. Nevertheless, they could take 
advantage of ius provocationis.
52
 
In 126, the tribune, M. Iunius Pennus, expelled all non-Romans from the city, 
possibly anticipating that these resident aliens would seek to assist Flaccus’ election.
53
 
Even if these resident aliens could not vote they could still influence their Roman 
associates. For instance, Cicero’s letter to Brutus mentions an orator, L. Papirius of 
Fregellae, who eloquently defended the Latin colonies in a speech delivered to the 
Senate.
54
 When Flaccus’ proposal to give the allies citizenship was rejected by the Senate 
in 125, the town of Fregellae responded by openly revolting against Rome.  
This revolt was a turning point, as Fregellae was not just an Italian community 
full of malcontents, but originally a Latin colony.
55
 Latin colonies almost uniformly 
remained loyal to Rome in times of rebellion. Out of all the communities to rebel against 
Rome during the Social War, Venusia was the only Latin colony to join the rebels. 
Furthermore, Fregellae’s citizens had been noted for extreme loyalty to Rome, as they 
opposed Hannibal’s advance through Italy by burning bridges across the Liris in 212.
56
 
Fregellae’s spontaneous rebellion in 125 says much about the level of discontent its 
citizens must have felt. After the rebellion, the town was consequently razed by a Roman 
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army under the praetor, Lucius Opimius, who would later oppose Gaius Gracchus’ 
political ambitions. However, putting down this rebellion would prove ineffective as both 
more Roman aristocrats became willing to support the allied cause, and more allied 
communities became increasingly discontent. 
Though the Gracchan land commission may have hurt noncitizens, Appian claims 
that the allies were more interested in citizenship than the land from ager publicus.
57
 As 
we will see below, issues concerning land and citizenship may be more closely linked 
than Appian would have us believe. Full Roman citizenship would likely have been seen 
as a way to alleviate the allies’ material concerns. 
Though their critics may lump the Gracchi brothers together as demagogues 
taking advantage of the allies’ sentiments, according to Plutarch, the Gracchi brothers had 
very distinct personalities.
58
 However, they shared similar goals and proved popular with 
the people. Plutarch attributes the failure of their individual political careers to their age 
difference of nine years preventing them from achieving prominence at the same time.
59
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Like his brother, Gaius had a close working relationship with the allies both on 
the land commission and in his later building projects.
61
 With such connections, it is easy 




Gaius was able to clear himself of charges of encouraging the allies at Fregellae to 
revolt. Nevertheless, even though at this point, Gaius had accomplished little on their 
behalf, Italian supporters flooded Rome during his campaign for the tribunate.
63
 Once in 
office, his reform program included a bill which would have given the allies the same 
voting rights as Roman citizens.
64
 After his reelection as tribune, Gaius offered an 
extension of Roman citizenship a second time, but in this effort his foil, Livius Drusus 
the Elder, instead proposed that Latins should not be beaten with rods even as a part of 
military discipline.
65
 Though the Italians could not vote during Gaius Gracchus’ 
tribunate, oligarchic elements in the Senate felt threatened enough by their presence at 
Rome to have the consul, Fannius, expel noncitizen Italians from the city during the 
voting process for Gaius’ reelection bid.
66
 
                                                          
61
 App. B.C. 1.23; Plut., Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus 27-8. 
62
 Plut., Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus 24.  
63
 Plut., Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus 24. 
64
 Plut., Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus 26. 
65
 App. B.C. 1.23; Plut. Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus 29-30. 
66
 App. B.C. 1.23; Plut. Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus 33. 
20 
 
Boren argues that Gaius Gracchus hurt the allies while on the land commission 
but sought their support for reelection by offering citizenship.
67
 However, Salmon notes 
that though Italians may have been politically slighted by the Senate’s rejection of Gaius 
Gracchus’ proposal to extend citizenship to the allies, they were not harmed materially 
then.
68
 Also, the Italians do not appear to have been harmed by the land commission after 
Gaius’ death in 121.
69
 On the contrary, twenty years later, Saturninus’ agrarian bill in 100 
was said to have been to the Italians’ benefit.
70
 Nevertheless, Italians must have watched 
the struggle for control of the Roman law courts between the equestrians and senators 
with increased anxiety since the judgments rendered there now impacted the allies far 
more than before the Hannibalic War when Rome displayed less interest in the allies’ 
local affairs.
71
 The allies may have viewed senatorial jurists as insular elitists, but they 
would have seen the equestrians as economic rivals.
72
 
While Livius Drusus is usually portrayed as pawn of the Senate, Boren argues that 
Drusus was more sympathetic to the allies than Plutarch and the other ancient writers 
would have us believe.
73
 Though Plutarch would have us believe that Drusus was simply 
attempting to outdo Gaius Gracchus in demagoguery, Boren believes that Drusus, 
instead, provided carefully considered responses to the increasingly wild proposals of 
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 He concludes by saying that Drusus’ success was based on the Romans’ desire 
to follow the Senate so long as it considered their needs.
75
 Drusus’ son of the same name 
later made such a concentrated effort to help the allies because of his father’s sympathetic 
view of the allies.
76
 In contrast, Boren believes the people distrusted Gaius Gracchus and 
Fulvius Flaccus and doubted their sincerity.
77
 Perhaps that is why so few were willing to 
help Gaius and Flaccus when their deaths were imminent. 
Though Boren’s theory is plausible, it is also highly speculative. Plutarch takes 
the time to stress Drusus’ good character, which may leave one to wonder why Drusus is 
then so willing to undermine Gaius even at the peril of the state itself.
78
 Appian’s account 
of Drusus the Elder’s tribunate is not as detailed and merely informs us of his role in 
countering Gaius’ legislation at the urging of the Senate.
79
 Ultimately, we cannot 
conclude with any certainty that Drusus’ counter-proposals to Gaius were even enacted 
once passed.
80
 The Gracchi, by contrast, were honored with statues after their deaths, 
which indicates that they were not as distrusted by the people as Boren may have us 
think, at least posthumously. 
Despite the prominence of Gaius and Flaccus and the number of their followers 
who were killed alongside them, they appear to have had little support from the general 
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populace of Rome when death was upon them. Lucius Opimius, who destroyed Fregellae 
in 125 as a praetor, as consul in 121 (and using the ambiguous mandate of the first 
senatus consultum ultimum) executed Fulvius Flaccus and Gaius Gracchus with 3,000 of 
their followers.
 81
 The consul of the following year, C. Papirius Carbo, acquitted Opimius 
on charges of murder. Any hope the allies had for enfranchisement was thrown into the 
Tiber for the time being. 
Scholars such as Gabba believe that Italian motivations for seeking citizenship 
were initially tied to the agrarian reforms of the Gracchi brothers, but under the 
consulship of Drusus the Elder the motivations turned to pure political advantage.
82
 
Likewise, Sherwin-White argues that though Fulvius Flaccus, Livius Drusus, and Gaius 
Gracchus all proposed extending Italian rights, the agrarian question vanishes after 125 
and cannot be the cause for allied agitation in the 90s.
83
  
However, Tweedie argues that land reform was still a central issue up to the 
Social War itself.
84
 Ancient sources neglect Drusus the Younger’s agrarian legislation 
which, of course, could alter modern perceptions of what the issues were.
85
 Drusus the 
Younger may have agitated for land reform in 91 because of an influx of veterans 
returning to Italy in 93 which needed to be settled.
86
 These 50,000 Roman and allied 
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veterans would have remained unsettled in Italy for about eighteen months and could 
have served as an important constituency to any bills Drusus sought to pass.
87
 Tweedie 
believes that Drusus’ legislation was designed to break the gridlock between allied claims 
over ager publicus and the legions’ need for an enlarged recruitment pool. However, as 
with other legislative projects Drusus supported, in trying to negotiate between the 
competing interests, Drusus only angered those he sought to help.
88
 
Between 100 and 90, Italian agitation at Rome grew more intense. In 95, the 
Romans responded with the passage of the Lex Licinia Mucia, which expelled Italians 
falsely claiming Roman citizenship from Rome. Cicero states that the purpose of the law 
was not to permanently expel non-Romans from the city but to prevent noncitizens from 
falsely acting as citizens.
89
 Salmon argues that this law turned Italian elites against Rome, 
doing more to cause the Social War than Drusus the Younger’s murder.
90
 However, Dart 
argues that the Lex Licinia Mucia was simply a continuation of previous policy, while 
conceding that the allies in 95 had an extreme desire for citizenship whereas in 125 they 
merely sought personal advantage under the Gracchan land commission.
91
 
It was expected that anyone who proposed legislation such as Drusus’ would gain 
a host of new fiercely loyal clients for the long term.
92
 Indeed, the Gracchi were accused 
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of attempting to establish tyrannies through popular appeal. The Roman “constitution”, in 
its ideal form at least, was a careful balance between monarchy, oligarchy, and 
democracy. Recognizing that the oligarchic elements of society had grown indifferent to 
the plight of the common folk had led reformers such as the Gracchi, Fulvius Flaccus, 
and Drusus the Younger to attempt to tilt the scales in favor of the democratic elements 
of society. However, popular leaders always bring the threat of tyranny through the 
masses or are at least readily accused of such. In order to avoid a radical transition in 
which the roles of oppressor and oppressed are not simply reversed, the changes must be 
moderate with concessions made by all parties. Further incorporating the allies as new 
citizens would help bring balance to the competing elements of Roman society provided 
that the legal mechanisms for accomplishing this would not overcompensate for existing 
deficiencies. The greatest difficulty in incorporating new citizens en masse into the 
voting tribes was how to distribute them. If the majority fell into a few rural tribes they 
could vote as a bloc, but even if they were more evenly distributed they could still 
potentially outnumber existing citizens at the polls by a significant margin, thus tipping 
the balance of power in favor of their patrons like Drusus.
93
  
The Livian tradition is largely negative towards Drusus the Younger.
 94
 This is 
reflected in Florus, who may lead the reader to believe the relationship between Drusus 
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and the allies was complex, but who ultimately judges the tribune to be self-serving.
95
 
However, Diodorus Siculus and Velleius Paterculus describe Drusus in a more positive 
light.
96
 Though Velleius believed the Italians’ desire for citizenship to be just, he still 
believed Drusus was using the allies’ cause to pass his legislation.
97
 On the contrary, 
Appian believed that Drusus’ other legislation was meant to pave the way for his 
citizenship reform.
98
 In Appian’s version, it is significant that the Italians approached 
Drusus for aid rather than the reverse.
99
 
Drusus’ tribunate in 91 adopted new platforms in order to achieve conservative 
goals such as changing control of the courts from the equestrians back to the Senate.
100
 
Indeed, after Gaius Gracchus initially changed control of the courts from the Senate to 
the equestrians, the new body proved just as corruptible as the former.
101
 By Drusus’ 
tribunate, bribery was supposedly such a common offense among both the equestrians 
and senators that they were irritated that he wanted to make bribe-taking a crime.
102
 
Salmon argues that Italian business interests in the provinces could be particularly 
damaged by the ill-will of the courts.
103
 Worse still, Italians were forced largely to be 
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spectators in the strife between political rivals at Rome.
104
 Italian negotiatores in the 
provinces would have seen Roman equestrians as competitors in their business ventures, 
meaning that these equestrian-run courts could do much to harm them.
105
 For this reason, 
some Italians were much more concerned for control of the courts than agrarian laws 
since agrarian laws were easier to circumvent than judicial laws.
106
 Nevertheless, Drusus 
pushed forward with land reform. Consequently, the Senate was angered by Drusus’ 
proposals to distribute land and grain even though the laws were meant to gather support 
for court reforms.
107
 Drusus also sought to establish a number of colonies to secure the 
support of the Roman people.
108
  
Drusus was successful in passing some of his measures, but at the expense of 
alienating important segments of Roman society. Granting citizenship to Italian allies was 
consistent with Drusus’ policy of attempting to appease those who might oppose his 
legislation.
109
 Though enfranchised Italians would take time to integrate into the Roman 




Quintus Poppaedius Silo, a leading Marsic noble of considerable military 
experience and one of the Social War’s chief generals for Italica, probably first lobbied 
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Drusus for Italian enfranchisement in early 91.
111
 The ties between leading Roman 
families and Italian elites were deep and complex.
112
 Drusus may not only have had ties 
to Silo but also Campania and Picenum.
113
 As such, Silo would be a natural leader in the 
Italian’s final attempts to gain citizenship through peaceful means and as a military leader 
in the following conflict. 
Silo had a following of some 10,000 men who saw Roman citizenship as a way of 
alleviating their individual problems. They allegedly had taken an oath that should they 
acquire Roman citizenship they would consider Rome their country and support 
Drusus.
114
 Though it is possible that this oath was fabricated by Drusus’ enemies, it is 
clear that there was some sort of mutual understanding between Drusus and the Italians, 
given their mutual support.
115
 Drusus’ knowledge of an assassination attempt upon the 
consuls during the annual Latin Festival raised suspicion that he was colluding with the 
Italians even though Drusus warned the consuls of the plot.
116
 
After Drusus’ measures were annulled by the Senate, the allies began agitating for 
revolt.
117
 Drusus did not veto the Senate’s decision to annul his legislation but warned 
that their actions would lose them the courts.
118
 Drusus recognized that the Senate’s 
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response would have consequences, but even he did not realize how far the allies’ 
response would go. Tensions flared between all parties, but violence was not yet a 
foregone conclusion. 
Silo led a group of 10,000 armed men to Rome at the summons of the tribunes, 
probably directed by Drusus. Silo was stopped by Gaius Domitius who convinced him 
that the Senate was in favor of granting the Italians citizenship and would likely give it if 
Silo proceeded peacefully. This encounter on the road convinced Silo to desist.
119
 The 
meeting was likely prior to Drusus’ death given the conciliatory nature of the meeting.
120
 
Dart further states that though the chronology is imprecise, it is likely that Drusus was 
still alive when his reforms were annulled.
121
 Various allegations were leveled against 
Drusus’ laws in order to justify their annulment.  
By the time Drusus’ laws were annulled, the situation at Rome had grown tense. 
One of Drusus’ clients had attempted to publicly strangle the consul Philippus for 
interrupting Drusus during a speech.
122
 Many of the allies were also beginning to turn 
violent. At the Picentine theater, an Italian comedian was killed by the crowd for 
commenting on the status of noncitizens while another actor was barely able to mollify 
them, narrowly avoiding the same fate himself.
123
 In another example of Italian unrest, a 
                                                          
119
 Diod. Sic. 37.13. 
120
 Dart 2014: 87. 
121
 Dart 2014: 88-91. 
122
 Val. Max. 9.5.2; Flor. 2.5.8. 
123
 Diod. Sic. 37.12. 
29 
 
native of Asculum, T. Betucius Barrus, championed allied rights by delivering a speech 
in Rome against Servilius Caepio.
124
 Now the allies not only sought out Romans to 




It is unclear from the sources who actually murdered Drusus at his home. Appian 
believes that the Etruscans and Umbrians were responsible, while other sources remain 
vague.
126
 But what is evident is that Drusus’ policy of giving every faction something to 
gain and something to lose agitated all parties to varying degrees. For instance, though 
the Etruscans and Umbrians had largely escaped any negative consequences from the 
Gracchan land commission, Drusus’ agrarian law would have made them the most likely 
to suffer.
127
 After Drusus died, the Etruscans and Umbrians appeared content.
128
  
Though Dart believes the Etruscans and Umbrians would not have had a reason to 
be in Rome after Drusus’ legislation had been annulled, Gabba argues that some 
Etruscans and Umbrians who were already adversely affected by his legislation may have 
harbored some resentment towards him.
129
 Tweedie believes that both Philippus and 
Drusus attempted to leverage wider Italian support to back their causes.
130
 It appears that 
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Though the date of Drusus’ murder is also uncertain, what does seem clear is that 
it was after his laws were annulled but before he reached the end of his tribunate.
132
 This 
would place his murder sometime between September 20
th





Like those of Flaccus and Gaius Gracchus, Drusus’ murder once again squashed the 
allies’ hopes for citizenship through legislation. However, the Gracchi and Flaccus were 
murdered for generally trying to court popular support, while Drusus’ murder was a 
direct result of championing allied enfranchisement. 
The Social War 
Italian Motivations 
Drusus’ murder was a severe blow to the cause of Italian enfranchisement, but the 
murders at Asculum which were to follow can at least retrospectively be seen as the spark 
that ignited the Social War. These latter murders, which will be explained in greater 
detail below, occurred at the peak of allied frustrations with Rome. Similarly tense 
episodes, which fell just short of violent death, also occurred just prior to these murders. 
The Romans did not recognize the degree of discontent among the allies up to the 
murders of all the Romans at Asculum. Picenium, Samnium, Lucania, Campania, and 
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Marsica were the most dissatisfied regions and received visits by Roman magistrates.
134
 




Hoping to quell any rebellious sentiments in the area, the praetor, Q. Servilius, 
went to Asculum to investigate the rising tensions in the city. Servilius treated the local 
population poorly and probably expected his presence to terrify them into submission.
136
 
Instead, they killed him and his legate Fonteius. 
The sources are divided on whether the Roman magistrates were murdered 
because of their mistreatment of their allies or because Servilius had discovered a plot to 
rebel against Roman hegemony. Diodorus believes it was because the allies feared the  
threats which Servilius made at Asculum, while Appian and Livy claim that it was 
because Servilius had discovered the preparations for rebellion.
137
 Whatever the case, all 
of the Romans in Asculum were murdered. When the Senate denied Asculum’s 
delegation any empathy in response to the murders, the allies’ options quickly dwindled. 
Even after Drusus’ death and the murders at Asculum, the allies were not fully 
committed to rebellion.
138
 Though the allies had likely been preparing to rebel for some 
time, it was only the Senate’s harsh response to the murders at Asculum which finally 
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pushed the allies to war.
139
 Though the citizens at Asculum were fully prepared to fight 
against Rome, their envoy to the Senate after the murders suggests that war was still not 
the only option under consideration. 
The sources agree that the allies felt an increasing desire for citizenship during the 
late republic, a sentiment which certain Roman politicians tapped into for various reasons 
as has previously been discussed. Certainly, later writers viewed the allies as the more 
sympathetic characters in this narrative. As Velleius Paterculus states, “Their fortune was 
as cruel as their cause was most just, for they sought citizenship in the state whose power 
they were defending by their arms”.
140
 Velleius continues “every year and in every war 
they were furnishing a double number of men, both of cavalry and of infantry, and yet 
were not admitted to the rights of citizens in the state which, through their efforts, had 
reached so high a position that it could look down upon men of the same race and blood 
as foreigners and aliens”.
141
 It is worth noting that, as a Campanian, Velleius had his own 
biases, and this certainly would have colored his interpretation of the Italian’s plight. In 
Florus’ analysis of the Social War, he concludes “though we call this war a war against 
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The sources compress the chronology of events in the rebel uprisings during the 
Social War. Though the ancient sources list entire peoples rebelling, certain individual 
cities did not. For instance, Pinna, an important city in Vestini, resisted the rebels, and 
remained famously loyal to Rome.
143
 Nevertheless, we might reasonably expect that 
when entire peoples are listed as having taken part in the rebellion that a majority of 
communities were involved. 
Livy, Diodorus, and Appian attempt to list the peoples who rebelled against Rome 
during the Social War. Salmon claims that there were a total of twelve peoples who 
rebelled.
144
 Livy lists seven: the Picentes, Vestini, Marsi, Paeligni, Marrucini, Samnites, 
and Lucani. Diodorus mentions five peoples: the Samnites, Asculani, Lucani, Picentes, 
and Nolani. Appian lists the insurgent peoples as the Marsi, Paeligni, Vestini, Marrucini, 
Picentes, Frentani, Hirpini, Pompeiani, Venusini, Iapygii, Lucani, and Samnites. Salmon 
says that the Asculani are probably the same people as the Picentes while the Nolani 
should be equated with the Pompeiani; he explains that Diodorus calls them the Nolani 
because Nola remained under that group’s control the longest, but Pompeiani more 
accurately describes where the rebellion in Campania broke out.
145
 Nola itself was not 
part of the rebel league, but was captured by the rebels. Appian’s list contains all the 
peoples that Livy and Diodorus include, so the only question which remains is whether or 
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not Appian’s list is complete.
146
 Rebel coinage variously depicts different numbers of 
soldiers swearing an oath over a sacrificial animal, but these vague images cannot be 
used to definitively demonstrate the number of rebel peoples at any one time since we do 
not know who exactly each soldier is supposed to represent.
147
  
Salmon argues that southern Italians were much more invested in provincial trade 
than Etruscans or Umbrians, which may have contributed to the latter groups’ reluctance 
to take up arms against Rome.
148
 Economic incentives or the lack thereof would help 
explain why certain communities may have been quicker to rebel than others. However, 
Sherwin-White observes that the greatest support for the Social War did not come from 
the sea ports but from Italy’s central highlands which were not directly involved in 
provincial trade.
149
 There does not appear to be a class division within individual 
communities, as there was in the Hannibalic War.
150
 In the previous conflict, the wealthy 
elites of individual communities tended to support Rome while the commoners favored 
Hannibal. Sherwin-White believes that the lack of class division during the Social War 
indicates that any material concerns were secondary to political needs.
151
 Whatever 
material concerns may have influenced some communities to rebel or remain loyal at the 
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outbreak of the Social War were ultimately subsumed by the desire for greater political 
equality as more and more communities joined the rebellion. 
Those who seek to portray the Social War as a conflict for independence are keen 
to stress the cultural differences between Rome and her subject peoples. However, 
Salmon notes that though the Samnites were primarily an Oscan-speaking culture the 
Marsi were heavily latinized by 91.
152
 This signifies that cultural differences likely did 
not play a large role in the outbreak of the Social War. However, the Marsi were such a 
prominent rebel group that Romans first identified this conflict as the Marsic War. The 
secessionists declaring Corfinium to be a city where all Italians may be equal signifies 
their desire was indeed equality.
153
 
Venusia is the only example of a Latin colony rebelling against Rome during the 
Social War. Earlier, Salmon argued that this was due to its Oscan influence.
154
 However, 
Dart believes that Venusia may have defected because it was cut off from Roman 
support.
155
 The city had a history of displaying loyalty to Rome on previous occasions. 
Indeed, Venusia served as a major base of operations for Roman commanders during the 
Hannibalic War. The rebel army under Vidacilius laid siege to a number of other loyal 
cities, killed the leading Roman citizens, and conscripted captured Romans and slaves 
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into his army, which may have convinced Venusia to defect.
156
 Little mercy may have 
been shown to Venusia otherwise. 
In the epitome of Book 46 of Livy, Q. Poppaedius Silo is described as the “dux et 
auctor eius rei”.
157
 Florus and Strabo also support this statement.
158
According to 
Plutarch, “they [the rebels] were not only strong in arms and men, but also had generals 
whose daring and ability were amazing and made them a match for the Romans.”
159
 The 
rebels had detailed knowledge of and experience with Roman military practices.
160
 
At the behest of the tribune Q. Varius Severus Hybrida, the Romans preoccupied 
themselves with establishing a court for the prosecution of those who incited the Italians 
to revolt in 90 just as the rebels declared their intentions. Despite some opposition in the 
Senate, enough equestrians supported the courts to ensure their establishment.
161
 The 
actual crimes investigated by these courts appear to amount to little more than association 
with Drusus or advocating for concessions being made to the allies.
162
 This may have 
served as a flimsy pretext for politicians to prosecute their Roman aristocratic rivals.
163
 
Those of Drusus’ supporters who were prosecuted included Aemilius Scaurus, C. Cotta, 
Calpurnius Bestia, Mummius Achaicus, L. Mummius, Q. Pompeius, and M. Antonius. In 
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The Formation of “Italia” 
Even as the Roman elite used the courts to drag each other down, reports of new 
cities rebelling reached Rome every day.
165
 Pobjoy states that though modern historians 
give relatively little attention to the impact of the rebel state of “Italia” on the Roman 
world, ancient writers saw it as the most important event up to that time.
166
 Indeed, few 
crises since the war with Hannibal can compare in magnitude as an existential threat to 
the Roman state. 
Gabba argues that the Italians knew that their ability to directly participate in 
Roman politics was limited by geographic circumstances, and that the Social War started 
as an aristocratic bid for independence from Rome rather than a popular uprising.
167
 
Local aristocrats would naturally lead their communities given their position of 
prominence and myriad connections, but independence is not what they sought. Such a 
claim is not supported by any of the ancient sources, which universally agree that Italian 
motivations for participating in the war were to gain Roman citizenship, something local 
aristocrats would benefit from far more than their communities at large. Sherwin-White 
claims a middle ground by stating that rebel motivations during the Social War were 
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mixed: some desired citizenship while others, particularly the Samnites, sought complete 
independence.
168
 Dart, however, effectively argues that the allies sought full Roman 




Understanding the motivations of the rebels during the Social War has been a 
divisive topic among modern scholars. The brief explanations offered by the sources have 
understandably left many unanswered questions for later generations to grapple with. 
This has made it very easy for modern readers to incorrectly associate the Social War 
with independence movements.  
There are many prominent examples in both ancient and modern history of rebels 
seeking freedom from their oppressors through violent means. Mythologized in modern 
fiction and popular topics from more recent history such as the American Revolution and 
French Revolution, it is difficult for many to imagine rebels desiring little outside of 
independence or regime change. Such cultural influences invariably color our own biases, 
and no scholar is immune to the zeitgeist of his or her own age. Though previous scholars 
such as Mommsen and Mouritsen have also argued that Italia was a regional 
independence movement, Pobjoy is the most recent scholar to do so, and perhaps most 
forceful.
170
 Arguments such as Pobjoy’s may seem very appealing because they align 
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with sentiments modern readers can easily identify with, but the topic is far more 
nuanced than Pobjoy’s treatment. 
Pobjoy stresses that the creation of the state of “Italia” was a bid for independence 
from Rome.
171
 Pobjoy believes that we should not take the stated motives for the Social 
War at face value because of the pro-Roman bias of many classical authors.
172
 But I 
believe Pobjoy places too much emphasis on the possible biases of these writers. Roman 
writers may have ultimately favored their empire over all other states as most people 
throughout most times tend to favor their homelands, but they were far from uncritical of 
either their predecessors or contemporaries.  
Indeed, when the Caledonian chieftain Calgacus famously claims “auferre, 
trucidare, rapere, falsis nominibus imperium; atque, ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem 
appellant” it should be remembered that these words were put into the Briton’s mouth by 
Tacitus.
173
 Classical writers were capable of self-critique and frequently did so in more 
damning terms than modern commentators. Furthermore, many of our most important 
sources for Roman history are actually Greek writers. Certainly this paper would hardly 
be possible without the contributions of Appian and Plutarch, while the likes of Strabo 
and Polybius are no less appreciated for the value of their perspectives. Modern scholars 
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should be critical of the ancient sources, but the burden of proof lies upon their shoulders 
when the sources are in agreement. 
Moreover, Pobjoy argues that rebels who set up their own government and 
afflicted massive casualties in battle could not then expect to be fully incorporated into 
the Roman state.
174
 He adds that fighting for a position of privilege within the Roman 
Empire while simultaneously jeopardizing the security which made the empire possible 
was irrational.
175
 These arguments are contingent upon perspectives which I am not 
convinced the participants in the Social War held. 
This first point hinges upon how permanent “Italia’s” government was meant to 
be. Diodorus suggests that “Italia’s” government was meant to mimic Rome’s by 
applying titles such as consul and praetor as a direct analogue to the Roman state.
176
 
Other sources variously describe rebel leaders as praetor, dux, στρατηγοί, and 
αὐτοκράτορες.
177
 Cicero describes Scato as dux Marsorum which is too vague to 
positively identify a magistracy of any sort.
178
 Modern scholars tend to agree that there is 
too little evidence in the sources to say much about “Italia’s” political structure, though 
“Italia’s” two supreme military commanders were Q. Poppaedius Silo and C. Papius 
Mutilus. 
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Sherwin-White states that the political structure of “Italia” bore similarities to the 
Roman government but was more correctly a critique of it.
179
 Though possessing 
magistrates, a senate, and a generally federal outlook, there is no indication that local 
autonomy was abolished nor is there direct evidence for a primary assembly of 
citizens.
180
 This could support Pobjoy’s view that “Italia” was intended to function as a 
permanent state, but Dart argues that “Italia” was only a loose confederation constructed 
for the sole purpose of conducting its war against Rome.
181
 “Italia” existed to do little 
more than organize and pay soldiers because Italian rebels had no intention of creating a 
more complex and permanent government.
182
 The rebels, therefore, fully intended to 
integrate with the Roman state.
183
 
To Pobjoy’s second point, rationality does not always govern one’s actions in 
something as violent and emotional as war. On the contrary, pride, ambition, revenge, 
and a host of other irrational motivations frequently play a crucial role in armed conflict. 
The rebels who fought in the Social War may have been unaware of the peril in which 
they put the empire, at least at first. Or perhaps they were fully aware of the risks but felt 
that their demands were worth it. At any rate, Marius, Sulla, and many others in both the 
immediate aftermath of the Social War and in subsequent generations would prove just as 
willing to jeopardize the security of the empire for a position of privilege within it. 
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Pobjoy further points to rebel negotiations with Mithridates VI of Pontus as 
evidence of “Italia’s” desire for independence, but he admits that these talks did not take 
place until 88, after the major battles of the war had been resolved.
184
 Instead, these 
negotiations may have been a last desperate maneuver by rebel commanders fearing for 
their individual fates in the face of defeat. As I see it, these negotiations with Pontus were 
meant to prolong the war only until the rebels could secure better terms for their 
surrender. Though an ultimate Roman victory may have seemed certain by this point, the 
post-war relationship between Rome and the allies was far from decided. 
Should the rebels have surrendered before they had secured all of the rights they 
believed they deserved, the much slower political mechanisms of the republic may have 
ensured that the allies’ concerns were never fully addressed. The rebels knew they needed 
to fight to expedite the political concessions which they felt were long overdue. 
Surrendering prematurely would have likely pushed back issues relating to Italian 
enfranchisement, and even after the Social War ended, precisely defining the new 
citizens’ political rights remained a contentious issue for years to come. 
Pobjoy also argues that just because Rome offered citizenship to loyal 
communities during the course of the war, that we should not take that to mean that the 
Italians fought with the aim of gaining Roman citizenship in mind.
185
 This argument only 
addresses the Lex Iulia issued in 90 while neglecting subsequent legislation such as the 
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Lex Plautia Papiria in 89 which did offer citizenship to communities which surrendered 
in a timely manner. (Both of these laws will be discussed in greater detail in the 
following sections.) After the Social War ended, the Romans then used ongoing issues 
concerning enfranchisement to gain Italian support in their own factional strife. Some 
rebel forces may never have laid down their arms even after the war’s conclusion; by the 
mid-eighties, these rebels now fought under the banners of Marius, Sulla, and whoever 
else promised to advance their cause. Citizenship was a critical issue to the allies in the 
decades both before and after the Social War. It hardly stands to reason that the allies 
would not want this citizenship during the war itself when considering Roman responses 
to the rebellion.  
To summarize my refutation of Pobjoy’s arguments, though some scholars view 
rebel cries for libertas as a desire for separation from Rome, libertas was a complex idea 
which did not necessarily exclude suffragium and provocatio in relation to Rome. Italian 
desires for citizenship and freedom should be viewed as they are listed in the sources: as 
a linked pair rather than separate or contradictory goals.
186
 Indeed, gaining the legal 
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Roman Overtures and Rebel Responses 
    As the outbreak of conflict with allies in Italy loomed, the quaestor in Cisalpine 
Gaul, Q. Sertorius, oversaw the recruitment of soldiers and collection of arms.
188
 These 
recruits consisted of both loyal allied Italians and Roman citizens.
189
 Appian claims that 
both rebel and Roman forces each recruited 100,000 infantry and cavalry per side at the 
outset of hostilities.
190
 Significant numbers of allied auxiliaries also served Rome during 
the war.
191
 Several legates were assigned to the consuls’ provinces within Italy, and the 
consuls went from territory to territory to oversee the war effort.
192
 
Initial rebel targets were loyal Latin colonies in the south. These attacks were 
designed to convince other cities to either join the rebellion or surrender. However, 
communities with Latin and Roman rights remained loyal during the initial wave of 
rebellion. Pinna became famous for its intense loyalty to Rome despite brutal murders at 
the hands of the rebels during the siege of their city.
193
 Similarly, Alba Fucens became 
famous for loyalty to Rome under pressure.
194
 
Dart argues that insurgent offensives remained close to rebel territory with the 
strategy of hoping to gain political advantage in negotiations through a long drawn out 
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 The strategy was to bog down the Romans in a costly war which would force 
concessions.
196
 The rebel forces’ desire to see loyalist defections seems to support this 
theory.
197
 Indeed, the threat of further defections in Etruria and Umbria is what 
eventually saw the Romans grant concessions to the allies. 
As more allies either rebelled or were rumored to be preparing for rebellion, the 
Romans believed making concessions to both loyal allies and repentant rebels would 
alleviate their situation. Regarding a meeting between the Roman consul, Pompeius 
Strabo, and the rebel commander, P. Vettius Scato, in 89, Cicero later summarized “the 
allies were not seeking to deprive us of our citizenship, but to be admitted to it 
themselves”.
198
 Dart notes that even if Scato only represented the views of his native 
people, the Marsi, their influence over the other rebels was no doubt significant.
199
 That 
certain rebel groups both joined the war and surrendered at different points may signify 
varying goals for each of the communities involved, but certainly the most contentious 
issue was not land rights or other economic incentives but enfranchisement and voting 
rights.  
Nola was an early target for the rebels. This city had famously withstood 
Hannibal’s assault, but in 90, rebel forces captured it.
200
 The Praetor, L. Postumius and 
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2,000 of his troops were captured by Papius Mutilus. When Mutilus offered the prisoners 
a chance to defect the common soldiers accepted, but Postumius and the officers refused. 
The leniency Mutilus offered to loyalist prisoners of war suggests that neither he nor the 
Samnites under his command were bitter separatists.
201
 Some, like the Roman officers 
who refused to convert, were firm in their convictions, but others could be persuaded to 
change sides, at least if they were put under sufficient pressure. 
Interestingly, Capua remained loyal to Rome during the Social War.
202
 Capua had 
previously been a rebel stronghold during the Hannibalic War, but, in defeat the city once 
considered second only to Rome in power was significantly reduced in status due to mass 
enslavement and resettlement at the war’s conclusion. Whatever ambitions Capua once 
had for Italian primacy were now extinguished in its new population.  
In 90, the rebel general, Vidacilius, persuaded the Latin colony of Venusia to 
defect. The city had previously displayed loyalty to Rome on multiple occasions, so 
suggesting that its defection was due to Samnite influence is doubtful. More likely, the 
colony defected because Vidacilius’ army laid siege to a number of neighboring cities, 
killed the leading Roman citizens, and conscripted captured Romans and slaves into his 
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army, isolating Venusia from Roman support.
203
 Given this perhaps surprising defection, 
the loyalties of almost anyone in the war could be called into question. 
The Marsic rebel discussed above, Q. Poppaedius Silo, used the false pretense of 
defecting back to the Romans as the means of leading the Roman commander, Q. 
Servilius Caepio, into an ambush where he and his soldiers were killed.
204
 Though this 
was nothing short of a lie on Silo’s part, the premise does suggest that rebels who 
defected back to the Roman cause might expect leniency, if not amnesty. Dart’s argument 
that the rebels who chose not to surrender between 90 and 88 did so because of fear of 
harsh punishments does not seem well supported by the willingness of both sides to seek 
out and use defectors and their displays of leniency upon capitulation.
205
 However, after a 
number of reversals for the rebels in the latter part of 90, a number of Italian commanders 
opted to commit suicide rather than surrender.
206
 
Though Appian makes no mention of a revolt in the northern parts of Italy in 90, 
both Livy and Orosius state that a battle was fought against the Etruscans and another 
against the Umbrians.
207 Appian suggests that the Lex Iulia, which granted citizenship to 
loyal allied communities, was passed amidst fears that Rome would be completely 
surrounded by enemies, and was intended to prevent such a revolt.
208
 However, our other 
                                                          
203
 Dart 2014: 132; App. B.C. 1.42. 
204
 App. B.C. 1.44. 
205
 Dart 2014: 190. 
206
 Liv. Per. 73; App. B.C. 1.47-8. 
207
 Liv. Per. 75; Oros. 5.18.17. 
208
 App. B.C. 1.49-50. 
48 
 
sources make it seem as if the law was in response to a revolt on the part of the Etruscans 
and Umbrians.
209
 In either case, the Lex Iulia was crafted out of military and political 
necessity.
210
 A rebellion in those regions was likely underway or about to be. Appian 
confirms that a rebel army was sent north in the winter of 90/89 to aid or incite rebellion 
there.
211
 Minor rebellions likely occurred in Etruria and Umbria because Roman forces 
felt compelled to go there.
212
 Were the threat of rebellion in Etruria and Umbria not 
serious, the Romans would not have committed forces there which might have otherwise 
been deployed in actively contested regions of Italy. Additionally, Florus claims that the 
city of Ocriculum in Umbria was destroyed and Faesulae in Etruria was sacked by Rome 
during the Social War.
213
 
The Lex Iulia suggests that though not all allied communities rebelled by 90, 
many allied communities were sympathetic to the rebel cause, since the law’s passage 
only came after many defections and the threat of further defections.
214
 However, the 
rebels’ initial successes were short-lived, and a number of rebel leaders were either killed 
or had commited suicide by the end of 90.
215
 A combination of these rebel setbacks and 
waning support for the war forced them to relocate their capitol from Corfinium to 
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Samnium in 89. Yet even until the end of 89, the rebels still held the important 
strongholds of Asculum, Corfinium, and Aesernia. 
After a long siege, Asculum fell to the Romans in November of 89. The rebel 
leaders were killed, and the residents’ slaves were sold off, but the surviving population 
was allowed to leave the city with their freedom.
216
 The victor of the siege, Pompeius 
Strabo, was the only general granted an official triumph for a victory in this war. This 
may have been because the Senate felt certain of victory by 89, and Pompeius’ triumph 




While we often read of communities deciding to rebel or remain loyal to Rome 
during the Social War, individual circumstances apparently influenced many to break 
with the decisions of their home communities. Loyalist forces did not just consist of the 
Romans themselves nor did they include only members of the communities which were 
officially loyal to Rome. A certain Minatius Magius who was a native of the Hirpinian 
city of Aeclanum raised a legion from among the Hirpini in support of the Romans and 
marched on Herculaneum. This legion helped the Romans capture the city, then helped 
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 This illustrates that the issues involved in the Social War were as 
nuanced as they were complex.  
Sulla laid siege to Aeclanum, which held out for reinforcements not from its 
fellow Hirpinians but from Lucania. The city’s leaders asked Sulla for time to consider 
his terms of surrender, hoping to stall him long enough for reinforcements to arrive, but 
Sulla saw through this ruse, piled wood against the city walls, and set fire to the pile. 
Aeclanum surrendered at the sight. Several other towns quickly surrendered to Sulla 
afterwards.  This, in addition to Minatius Magius’ pro-Roman forces being raised in the 




As we have previously seen, Venusia likely joined the rebels due to external 
pressure, and now the fortunes of war were clearly in Rome’s favor. Given that Venusia 
and Canusium were still wealthy in the days of Augustus, these communities may have 
surrendered willingly rather than being forcefully subdued during the Roman campaigns 
in Apulia of 89.
220
 If Venusia and Canusium had to be taken by force, their wealth would 
have likely been confiscated, and their populations reduced through slaughter and 
enslavement. Pompeius Strabo formally received the surrender of the Marsi, Marruncini, 
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and Vestini in 88.
221
 Pompeius had won a series of victories in the north while Sulla 
continued to press on the gains of the previous consul, L. Iulius Caesar, in the south.  
The rebels, including Q. Poppaedius Silo, retreated to Samnium and Apulia in 89. 
After this retreat, Silo was appointed supreme commander out of the five surviving 
generals. The rebels numbered about 30,000 at this point, but Silo raised an additional 
20,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry by manumitting slaves, bringing their total to a little 
more than 50,000 by 88.
222
 
In early 88, Silo retook Bovianum and entered the city in triumphal procession. 
Sulla had captured this stronghold in 89, and Silo’s triumph was just as much about 
boosting the morale of his soldiers as reasserting rebel control over the fortress.
223
 Even 
in victory the rebel soldiers must not have been overly optimistic at this point. Regaining 
a city can be an important step in a war effort; but, compared to the previous losses, this 
victory likely seemed small. 
After the victory at Bovianum, Silo crossed the Apennines in an effort to reinforce 
Apulia. However, Silo was intercepted by a Roman army under the command of Mam. 
Aemilius Lepidus. Silo was badly defeated and was numbered among some 6,000 rebel 
dead.
224
 The details provided for this battle by Diodorus, Appian, and Livy’s summarizer 
are both garbled and brief, but Teanum, an Apulian city which was likely loyal to Rome 
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throughout the war, may have served as the Roman base of operations for the 
attack.
225
According to Appian, Metellus, the proconsul over the legate Lepidus, accepted 
the surviving rebels into his own army as separate detachments.
226
 
The Resolution of the Conflict between Rome and its Allies 
Silo’s death was a major blow to the rebel cause. Appian and Livy treat his death 
in 88 as the end of the war, although Florus treats the fall of Asculum in 89 as the war’s 
end.
227
 However, many rebels had not yet surrendered at either of these points, and 
certain rebel groups may have been continuously under arms from the outbreak of the 
Social War until the Battle of the Colline Gate in November of 82. Though what event 
should be viewed as the end of the Social War may be somewhat unclear, what can be 
said for certain is that the Italians fighting after 87 were now participants in a new round 
of civil wars between various Roman factions from whom the Italians believed they 
could benefit, marking a different character from the previous conflict. 
The Lex Iulia, the first major concession Rome made to the allies during the 
Social War, enfranchised all loyal Italian allies south of the Po in 90, while the Lex 
Plautia Papiria offered citizenship to rebels who surrendered within sixty days of its 
passage in 89. The passage of these two laws is insufficient in explaining how the vast 
                                                          
225
 Dart 2014: 169; Diod. Sic. 37.2.9-10; App. B.C. 1.53; Liv. Per. 76.  
226
 App. B.C. 1.53. 
227
 App. B.C. 1.53; Livy Per. 76; Flor. 2.6.10. 
53 
 
majority of Italians gained full citizenship in the Social War’s aftermath.
228
 The Lex 
Pompeia, Lex Calpurnia, a number of other individual treaties with Italian communities, 




The Lex Iulia was passed in the winter of 90/89 either because of a revolution in 
Etruria and Umbria or because there was about to be one.
230
 Scholars tend to agree that 
since at least 122, magistrates in Latin colonies had been given full citizenship, meaning 
that most of the leading men would have had the citizenship by 90. These leading men 
could have held rebellious elements in the Latin colonies in check throughout the Social 
War.
231
 The Lex Iulia was far broader in scope than any previous legislation concerning 
enfranchisement. How broad exactly is still unclear to modern scholarship. 
Whether the Lex Iulia just applied to Italians or included communities possessing 
Latin Rights in Cisalpine Gaul and Spain is unclear.
232
 As mentioned earlier, allies who 
gained full Roman citizenship risked losing local autonomy. According to Appian, all 
loyal allied communities accepted the Lex Iulia, even though they were placed into ten 
new tribes which voted after all the others.
233
 Heraclea and Neapolis considered 
accepting foederis sui libertatem, their former legal status as allies with domestic 
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autonomy, but ultimately chose full Roman citizenship.
234
 Though many allies 
undoubtedly accepted the terms of the Lex Iulia in good faith, there were many allies who 
remained unsatisfied with its terms. Appian’s oversimplification becomes apparent as we 
learn of subsequent laws and treaties which became necessary to integrate the allies more 
fully, particularly as Marius and Sulla competed to gain favor with allies who remained 
uncertain of their true legal standing within the republic. 
Although Appian assumes that the Lex Iulia was to place the allies into ten new 
tribes, Velleius states that the allies were to be placed in eight existing tribes.
235
 Scholars 
have tried to reconcile this discrepancy by arguing that Latins would go into existing 
tribes while other allies would go into the ten new tribes, or that the allies were initially 
intended to go into ten new tribes but were later incorporated into eight existing tribes. 
Salmon’s interpretation that the ex-rebels and other new citizens would not stand for 
being enrolled in ten new tribes and were eventually distributed into eight existing tribes 
seems to be the most correct assessment.
236
 Again, this ambiguity in allied legal status 
during the Social War, and in the years after, undoubtedly caused some rebels to hesitate 
before accepting the Romans’ terms. Indeed, some rebel forces never accepted Rome’s 
terms, yet aligned themselves with Marius in his fight against Sulla in the hopes that 
Marius would guarantee their rights. These rebel forces were later destroyed by Sulla at 
the Battle of the Colline Gate in 82.  
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As mentioned earlier, Pobjoy entirely neglects the Lex Plautia Papiria, which was 
possibly Rome’s second concession to the allies, in making his argument that Rome’s 
offers of citizenship do not necessarily correspond to rebel desires.
237
 Velleius states that 
“The Romans gradually recovered their strength ‘recipiendo in civitatem qui arma aut 
non ceperant aut deposuerant maturius’”.
238
  The citizenship was offered to those who 
surrendered by a certain date, and at least some took advantage of the opportunity. 
However, what exact rights and responsibilities would come with this citizenship may 
have been left intentionally ambiguous at the time so as to convince rebels who might 
interpret this term generously to surrender quickly while Roman politicians could later 
impose more restricted forms without having openly lied to the rebels.  
Modern scholarship goes to great lengths in its efforts to understand exactly what 
it is the Romans offered the rebels. Brunt does not believe individual grants of citizenship 
were taken advantage of under the Lex Plautia Papiria, but insists that the rebels would 
have chosen to remain loyal to their local communities in this life-and-death struggle.
239
  
However, there are examples to the contrary of pro-Roman forces being raised from rebel 
communities in the midst of the war. 
Brunt further states that the Italians who surrendered to Rome during the Social 
War had only become dediticii, conquered people who were not enslaved, allied, or 
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citizens of Rome, and that they were finally granted full citizenship by the Senate in 87 
only to gain their support against Cinna and Marius.
240
  If this is true, surrendering rebels 
would have gained or retained individual freedoms, but would have held none of the 
political rights many were fighting for in the first place. The Senate also offered 
citizenship to Samnites, Nolans, and Lucanians still under arms at this time, but 
negotiations between the Senate and these latter groups broke down.
241
  
Salmon argues that initial offers of citizenship in the wake of the Social War 
essentially equated to civitas sine suffragio since the allies were to be allotted to ten new 
tribes which would vote after all the others.
242
  I believe Salmon’s interpretation is 
correct, since voting in the assemblies stopped as soon as a majority had been reached. If 
a citizen were assigned to a tribe which voted later in the assemblies, he may realistically 
never vote at all except perhaps when the most divisive issues were at the polls. Marius 
and Cinna were less scrupulous and promised to grant all of the allies’ demands. 
The passage of the Lex Iulia and subsequent legislation is a major turning point 
for Italian enfranchisement. The allies seem to have been given exactly what they 
wanted, even if at the cost of thousands of lives. But in order to understand how well this 
legislation was implemented, we must next look at relevant census figures both prior to 
the Social War and in the decades which followed. These figures will play an important 
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part in helping us understand why some rebels did not immediately surrender as the 
Romans offered concessions to the allies. 
The failed census of 89 may have contributed to delaying the enrollment of 
citizens under the Lex Iulia. Modern scholars argue that a religious technicality may have 
been used to prevent the census from being completed. This would not have been the first 
time Roman officials shirked their responsibilities towards the allies in the late republic, 
as was the case in allied appeals during the Gracchan land commission. When Cicero 
claims that there was not a census in 89, we may assume it was because of a breach in 
augural law which made the accompanying lustrum “parum felix” as described by 
Festus.
243
 Wiseman adds that the census could not be completed correctly without a 
lustrum since this rite of state renewal required a lustrum to conclude it.
244
  
Intentional or not, this failure in the census was surely noted by allies keen to take 
full advantage of their newly promised citizen rights. More importantly, this may also 
have convinced rebels who might have otherwise laid down their arms in 89 to continue 
to resist until they were more certain that the Romans would actually follow through on 
their promises. Dart goes so far to say that some enfranchised allies may have been 
reluctant to report to a censor within the given period due to the uncertainty of their tribal 
allotment, or that some simply may not have been able to reach a magistrate within the 
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 This may partially explain the low census figure in 86. However, Dart 
argues that rebels who did not surrender between 90 and 88 could not have done so safely 
in 87 since they would likely have been executed or enslaved.
246
 I do not think that 
reluctance to report to a praetor or fear for the safety of rebels who failed to surrender in a 
timely manner are sufficient explanations for why rebels continued to raise new forces up 
to 87. The only adequate explanation for this continued resistance is linked to the 
observation that some allies, eager to participate in Roman government, recognized that 
vague promises of enfranchisement did not actually guarantee anything.  
The census of 115 recorded 394,336 citizens while the census of 86 recorded 
463,000 citizens.
247
 This was an increase of about 68,000 citizens after the Social War. It 
is possible that the census figure of 86 has been corrupted. The original census figure for 
86 may have actually been 963,000 which is 53,000 higher than the number of citizens 
registered in 70. Casualties during the intervening civil wars may explain the drop in 
citizens between 86 and 70, however, it is more likely that the original figure of 463,000 
for the census of 86 is correct.
248
 Still, this figure is much lower than one might expect 
given how desperate the allies seemed to gain full Roman citizenship. 
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Cicero believes that the censors of 86 were not guilty of any wrong-doing despite 
the skepticism of modern scholars.
249
 Regional instability may explain a lower turnout for 
the census.
250
 Soldiers out on campaign would not have been counted in the census, 
lowering the figure further.
251
 
However, Cicero’s need to defend the censors’ actions suggests that there must 
also have been ancient skeptics. Whether the censors had acted correctly or not, it seems 
highly probable that at least some doubted that the results of the census were authentic by 
Cicero’s day, if not by the time the census itself had been completed. Doubts concerning 
the legitimacy of the census of 86 may have also made some rebels reluctant to surrender. 
At the very least, doubts concerning the census could be played upon by savvy Roman 
magistrates eager to gain Italian support for their own ends. 
The next census in 70 counted 910,000 citizens. This increase of 447,000 new 
citizens cannot be attributed to population growth alone, any more than the low figure of 
86 can be explained solely by the devastation of the Social War. Instead, Italians who had 
previously failed to report to a censor or had previously failed to be reported were at last 
counted. There is little reason to believe that the census figure of 86 had been corrupted, 
since Cicero felt the need to respond to allegations of foul play in his day. 
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This is an increase of more than half a million over the last figure before the 
Social War. When taking all of these figures into account, the census of 86 seems 
suspiciously low.
252
 Brunt believes that the censors of 86, L. Marcius Philippus and M. 
Perperna, may have deliberately botched the census in order to weaken Cinna’s position 
through Italian discontent.
253
 The allies expected to be granted the rights they had been 
promised, and failure to deliver on those promises would reflect very poorly on the head 
of state. Philippus had previously opposed Drusus the Younger and may still have 
harbored resentment against the allied cause, but Perperna’s political stance is unknown. 
Brunt, however, is willing to align Perperna with Sulla.
254
 The censors may have chosen 




Sulla, who was elected consul in 88 due to his successful campaigning in the 
latter part of the Social War, eventually confirmed Italian rights, but did not hold a census 
during this consulship, his second consulship in 80, nor his dictatorship in 81 during 
which he was tasked with settling the constitution. He also tried to deprive the 
communities of Arretium and Volaterrae of their citizenship. The courts responded by 
striking down Sulla’s attempt to nullify their rights.
256
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Though Sulla missed at least a few opportunities to support allied 
enfranchisement, other measures slowly increased the number of citizens throughout 
Italy. The Lex Calpurnia authorized individual grants of citizenship to allied soldiers for 
bravery.
257
 Depending on whether it was passed in 90 before the Lex Iulia or after in 89, 
this law may have either served as the foundation for the Lex Iulia or closed a loophole in 
it which prevented allied soldiers from gaining citizenship if their home communities 
were at war with Rome.
258
  
The Lex Papiria and Lex Pompeia both built on the Lex Iulia and should be dated 
to 89.
259
 The consul Cn. Pompeius Strabo passed the Lex Pompeia, which confirmed that 
communities south of the Po had full citizenship while Italian communities to the north 
had Latin Rights. However, the censors of 65 still debated whether or not those who were 
north of the Po should be counted as citizens.
260
 For many northern Italian communities, 
having a few elected officials gain Roman citizenship would have been sufficient to voice 
their concerns. The elites would gain status while the influx of new citizens would remain 
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The Lex Plautia Papiria reiterated the provisions of the Lex Iulia, but it was 
aimed at communities which were ineligible under the previous law.
262
 This law’s goal 
was to further isolate remaining rebels.
263
 The end result was that nearly the entire Italian 
peninsula became a vast network of coloniae and municipia with full citizen rights. 
The new citizens were initially to be placed into ten new tribes which voted after 
all of the others; a senatus consultum in 86 placed them into the existing thirty-one rural 
tribes, even though opponents of this plan may have feared the allies would have 
dominated this voting bloc. The Frentani and Marruncini were placed in the Arnensis 
tribe while the Marsi and Paeligni were grouped into the Sergia. The Samnites were 
broken up, with the Pentri going into the Vottinia tribe, most of the Hirpini being 
assigned into Galeria, and Aeclanum being placed in Cornelia. Though new citizens 
could have been registered into these tribal allotments as early as 86, Dart believes that 
the violence of the 80s and 70s left many unassigned until decades later.
264
 Politicians of 
every faction would use the uncertainty felt by these unassigned allies to their advantage 
in the coming civil wars. 
The principle rivalry we are concerned with in matters of allied enfranchisement 
is that of Marius and Sulla. In an effort to undermine Sulla, Marius convinced the 
Tribune of the Plebs, P. Sulpicius Rufus, to write legislation in 88, the Lex Sulpicia, 
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restoring Marius to a position of prominence while undermining his opponents. The 
command against Mithridates would be transferred from Sulla to Marius, exiles would be 
recalled, and new citizens and freedmen would be enrolled in the thirty-five existing 
tribes.
265
 Marius intended to use the newly enfranchised Italians for his own ends.
266
 
The newly enfranchised citizens would have dominated the thirty-one rural tribes, 
effectively giving control of the assembly to Marius.
267
 This was the same fear opponents 
of enfranchisement expressed from the beginning.
268
 Though the question of whether or 
not the allies would be fully integrated into Roman politics still hung in the balance, the 
nature of the debate changed to one of political theater, with various factions 
championing the allied cause for their own ends and others opposing it as a means of 
denying their rivals support. 
The Lex Sulpicia was passed in 88, but with violence in the streets leading up to 
the vote.
269
 Sulla and the other consul, Rufus, attempted to stall the vote, but Sulpicius 
claimed that the cessation of public business was illegal. The mob killed Rufus’ son and 
Sulla’s son-in-law, but the consuls themselves managed to escape. After the Lex Sulpicia 
was passed, Sulla marched on Rome with six legions, forcing Marius, Sulpicius, and their 
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Once Sulla had control of Rome, he repealed the Lex Sulpicia. Cicero claims that 
Sulla was able to repeal this law because violence was used in its passage.
271
 Whatever 
legal mechanisms were used or invented to overturn the law, the object was to negate 
Marius and Sulpicius. However, violence over the issue of enfranchisement was far from 
over. 
Though our attention has largely been on Rome itself since the official conclusion 
of the Social War, we must now turn our attention back to those rebels who had not 
surrendered in the immediate aftermath of the war’s final battles. Many rebel groups 
remained active from the war’s conclusion in 88 to the Battle of the Colline Gate in 82. 
However, we shall see that, though there was a continuous cycle of violence perpetuated 
by many of the same actors in this period, the question of Italian enfranchisement was 
changing form. In this transitory period, the question would change from whether or not 
the allies would be enfranchised to who would enfranchise the allies; and, more 
importantly, claim their support. 
Diodorus describes the rebels who continued fighting after Silo’s death in 88 as 
only Samnites, Sabellians, and Lucanians under the command of Lamponius and 
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 There is some confusion as to the exact identities of the remaining rebel 
commanders, but Tiberius Clepitius was almost certainly the Cleptius who commanded 
six hundred Lucanians in 103 while assisting the propraetor, L. Licinus Luculus, in 
suppressing a Sicilian slave revolt.
273
 Whoever they were, some rebels clearly did not 
surrender in 88, and remained under arms well after the war’s end.  
These rebels still fighting after Silo’s death appealed to Mithridates for aid. Some 
scholars argue that this reflects a general anti-Roman sentiment among the Italians; 
however, Gabba believes that this appeal only represented the last few extremists.
274
 Dart 
adds that since Mithridates slaughtered both Romans and Italians alike in Asia the rebels 
must have been desperate to call upon him in the first place.
275
 Whether he was unwilling 
or unable to comply with the rebels’ request, Mithridates did not send an expedition to 
Italy. 
L. Cornelius Cinna and Cn. Octavius were elected as the consuls of 87. When 
Sulla left to fight Mithridates, Cinna began advocating for the newly enfranchised Italians 
and to recall Marius from exile, despite having pledged to follow Sulla’s policies.
276
 
Octavius opposed Cinna’s proposals to enroll the new citizens into the existing tribes. 
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Cinna attempted to rally slaves to his cause, but this failed. He then turned to the newly 
enfranchised cities of Tibur, Praeneste, and Nola for support.
277
 
Cinna was deposed as consul and replaced by L. Merula. Cinna gathered former 
rebel forces to his cause at Capua and other strongholds.
278
 Marius joined Cinna, 
Sertorius, and Carbo outside of Rome with six thousand Etruscans. They sacked Ostia 




Some scholars believe that this senatorial decree mentioned in the epitome of 
Book 80 of Livy enfranchised all rebels who subsequently surrendered, and that these 
Italians were then enrolled in the rural tribes. We should follow this interpretation, firstly 
because the question of into which tribes to distribute the Italians disappears after 87.
280
 
From 87 on, the question among the allies then focuses on whether or not they will be 
allowed to exercise their rights. Secondly, Sulla proves just as willing to work with the 
Italians as his rivals.
281
 All that remained to be settled for the Italians was if their 
promised rights would be realized, and which Roman faction would ultimately take 
responsibility for seeing it through. However, as the discussion of the census of 86 
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shows, this concession still was not enough to convince some rebels to lay down their 
arms. 
Marius’ siege of Rome forced the Senate to recall Metellus Pius from operations 
in Samnium and Apulia and offer the rebels in central and southern Italy reasonable 
terms. Metellus refused to grant the Italian combatants citizenship, but, upon learning of 
Metellus’ denial, Marius granted them everything they desired.
282
 Interestingly, much of 
the army which sacked Rome consisted of soldiers from former rebel communities.
283
 
According to Livy, at this time the “Samnites” took up arms again.
284
 This was 
likely a rebel army which had been active since 88.
285
 This army or armies also included 




The force or forces, likely active since the Social War, were commanded by 
Marcus Lamponius who was a Lucanian, Pontius Telesinus who was a Samnite, and 
possibly Tiberius Clepitius, also a Lucanian. The first two were prominent commanders 
during the main fighting of the Social War.
287
 No ancient source explains these men’s 
continued resistance while the rest of Italy contented itself to participate in Roman 
factional conflicts. However, I think it is probable that they were holding out for the most 
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favorable terms possible. They may have been among the rebels to negotiate with Marius 
in 87, and they certainly were among the younger Marius’ supporters in 83.
288
 
After Sulla left Italy, according to Diodorus, three generals by the names of 
Marcus Aponius, Tiberius Clepitius, and Pompeius laid siege to Isae in Bruttium, then 
took part of the army to simultaneously besiege Rhegium. The governor of Sicily, Gaius 
Norbanus, repelled the rebels at Rhegium.
289
 Diodorus likely garbled the names of these 
commanders, and they are probably Lamponius, Telesinus, and Clepitius instead.
290
 M. 
Aponius is almost certainly Marcus Lamponius, referred to as such in an earlier passage 
of Diodorus.
291
 Dart believes Pompeius is possibly an error for the surviving Samnite 
leader Pontius Telesinus, who is referred to as fighting alongside Lamponius by Appian 
and Velleius.
292




Dating the siege of Rhegium is uncertain though some scholars prefer a date of 
either 88 or 87. Cinna, Carbo, Marius, and his son continued to gather support from the 
newly enfranchised Italians in order to create an army which could repel Sulla upon his 
                                                          
288
 Dart 2014: 199. 
289
 Diod. Sic. 37.2.13-4. 
290
 Dart 2014: 200. 
291
 Dart 2014: 200; Diod. Sic. 37.2.13 
292
 Dart 2014: 200; App. B.C. 1.90; Vell. Pat. 2.16, 2.27. 
293
 Salmon 1967: 368-9. 
69 
 
return to Italy. The Italians felt Sulla was hostile to their cause.
294
 There may have been 
as many as 70,000 armed Italians prepared to fight against Sulla by 83.
295
  
However, it is generally accepted that both factions had ulterior motives for 
supporting the Italians and, like politicians of any age who are keenly aware of the fickle 
nature of public opinion, their positions were somewhat ambiguous. Sulla used an 
extensive propaganda campaign to undermine Marius’ opposition, though we know little 
about it.
296
 Likewise, the Marians had done all that they could to drain the resolve of 
Sulla’s forces in Greece and damage his efforts against Mithridates.
297
  
Though Cinna had thus far championed the cause of the newly enfranchised 
citizens, he had been slow to act.
298
 Thus, Italian opposition to Sulla was not 
insurmountable, and the Italians did not view the two parties all that differently.
299
 The 
Periochae of Livy for this period state “novis civibus senatus consulto suffragium datum 
est”, demonstrating that as late as 84 Italian suffrage was unequally expressed since at 
least some new citizens had not yet been given the right to vote before now.
300
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In 84, Sulla sent letters to the Senate claiming to seek vengeance against Cinna, 
Carbo, and their supporters, but stating that he had no quarrel with the new citizens.
301
 
Santangelo notes that Sulla also sought support from various Italian communities which 
would not interfere with his rise to power in Rome.
302
 Many Italian communities in the 
80s seem to have intended to negotiate for greater rights within the citizen body, but only 
threw nominal support behind one faction or the other.
303
 
This opportunism on the part of the Italian allies can be seen in their fickleness 
towards Cinna and Carbo. Carbo wanted to take hostages from all Italian cities to secure 
their loyalty, but the Senate blocked this measure.
304
 However, he and Cinna did raise an 
army which was prepared to deploy to Illyria where they intended to oppose Sulla.
305
 
While the army was in transit, Cinna’s soldiers murdered him once they realized his 
intentions.
306
 Carbo recalled the men who had crossed to Illyria, but hesitated to return to 
Rome until the tribunes threatened to strip him of his office should he not return to 
oversee the election of Cinna’s replacement.
307
 
Sulla went unopposed through Campania by being careful not to unnecessarily 
anger former rebel communities.
308
 The consul C. Norbanus, a Marian, was defeated near 
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Mount Tifata. The other consul, L. Cornelius Scipio Asigenes, then went out to stop 
Sulla, but his army consisted of newly enfranchised Italians who sought a peaceful 
outcome. Scipio saw mass defections from his army once Sulla assured the Italians he 
would not restrict their rights.
309
 
The younger Marius was defeated by Sulla at Sacriportus and fled to Praeneste to 
the east of Rome. Marius was admitted to the city but his army was trapped outside the 
gates. Sulla captured these soldiers and executed all “Samnites” among them, according 
to Appian.
310
 Plutarch does not tell us what Sulla did with the captives he took at this 
point; but, upon capturing Praeneste, Sulla executed all of the Marians.
311
 Again, the term 
“Samnites” is probably being loosely applied to the soldiers under Lamponius and 
Telesinus. Plutarch makes note that there are not only Samnites but also a number of 




One of Carbo’s armies, consisting of eight legions under Marcius, went to 
Praeneste to relieve Marius but was soundly defeated in an ambush. The survivors 
blamed Marcius for the ambush. One of Marcius’ legions marched back to its home of 
Ariminum under its own standards without orders, while most of the remaining survivors 
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melted back into their home communities in smaller groups. Marcius returned to Carbo 
with only seven cohorts.
313
 
Lamponius, Telesinus, and a third man named Gutta the Capuan raised an army of 
70,000 strong in support of Carbo. Then, Telesinus and Lamponius ravaged Campania.
314
 
Next, they marched to relieve Marius at Praeneste, but Sulla’s forces were already there. 
Thwarted in their efforts to relieve Marius, Lamponius and Telesinus needed a new 
objective. 
With Pompey’s army pursuing Lamponius and Telesinus, the two decided to 
attack Rome instead of relieving Marius. At dawn, battle began near the Colline Gate.
315
 
Telesinus and Lamponius defeated Rome’s defenders, but they had wasted just enough 
time for Sulla’s forces to arrive by the afternoon.
316
 A separate army of Lucanians 
commanded by Albinovanus deserted and went over to the army of Metellus.
317
 
Albinovanus fled to the consul Norbanus, murdered some of the consul’s lieutenants, and 
then surrendered to Sulla. 
Velleius Paterculus records an interesting scene from the battle in which 
Telesinus urged his men on by saying “the last day is at hand for the Romans… These 
wolves that made such ravages upon Italian liberty will never vanish until we have cut 
                                                          
313
 App. B.C. 1.90. 
314
 Plut. Sulla, 29.1; App. B.C. 1.90. 
315
 Plut. Sulla, 29. 
316
 App. B.C. 1.90; Plut. Sulla, 29.1-8; Vell. Pat. 2.27.1. 
317
 App. B.C. 1.91. 
73 
 
down the forest that harbors them.”
318
 Telesinus was continuously under arms since the 
height of the Social War. However, now he was at least nominally fighting on behalf of 
Marius and his supporters. Discerning Telesinus’ motivations during this battle can then 
be somewhat problematic. 
In an effort to clarify Telesinus’ motivation, some have suggested that this speech 
may have been more specifically directed against Sulla. Perhaps the speech should 
instead indicate Telesinus’ anger was directed against those Romans who had trampled 
over Italian liberty.
319
 It seems unlikely that Telesinus intended to start a new round of 
rebellions while so enmeshed with the Marians. 
Fighting continued until night. Telesinus was found wounded among the 
casualties. According to Velleius, he had the appearance of a conqueror despite his 
defeat. Sulla executed him, and had Telesinus’ head and the heads of the other dead 
officers fixed to spears which he paraded around the walls of Praeneste.
320
 Sulla executed 
the non-Roman prisoners and did not spare Marcius and Carinas “even though they were 
Romans”.
321
 This battle effectively ended the Marian party and ensured the dominance of 
Sulla. 
After the Battle of the Colline Gate, the survivors were captured and executed. 
Telesinus’ younger brother and Marius killed each other at Praeneste when they realized 
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they could not escape the city. After Praeneste was captured, the prisoners were separated 
into three groups: Roman citizens, “Samnites”, and Praenestines. According to Appian, 
though Sulla had executed all of the prisoners taken at the Battle of the Colline Gate 
because they were “mostly Samnites”, in this case he spared the Roman citizens before 
slaughtering the rest of the prisoners.
322




Like Marius and Cinna before him, Sulla’s triumphal entry to Rome saw the 
annihilation of his enemies. Also like Marius and Cinna, Sulla’s army contained large 
groups of former rebels. Though our sources sometimes broadly label Sulla’s non-Roman 
enemies as Samnites, a careful examination shows that other ethnic groups were 
included. Sulla ruthlessly butchered his enemies, but the slaughter was not 
indiscriminate.
324
 Likewise, he deliberately chose his targets while sparing loyal persons 
and communities.
325
 Though “Samnites” who opposed Sulla were treated harshly, those 
who supported him might expect him to advance their cause. 
The death of Telesinus in 82 marks the end of the last significant group of former 
rebels to have survived intact beyond 88. Other conflicts such as Spartacus’ slave 
rebellion may have possibly been abetted by ongoing resentment over the Social War 
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though this was not a direct product of the former conflict.
326
 There were many rounds of 
civil war to follow after the Social War, and lingering issues certainly motivated specific 
groups to continue fighting. However, the reasons for Italian participation in these 
conflicts changed over time. By the Census of 70, the allies were at last fully integrated 
into the Roman political system. The motivations driving Italian participation in Rome’s 




The Roman unification of Italy was a slow, evolutionary process which changed 
shape numerous times. Before the Hannibalic War, many Italians saw little value in 
Roman citizenship, and rebellions against Rome took the form of independence 
movements. After the Hannibalic War, the differences between various Italic peoples 
became less distinct, and Roman citizenship became much more coveted. Though 
Hannibal’s intention was to break up Roman hegemony, he unintentionally strengthened 
Rome’s grip on Italy in the long-term. 
The rebels in the Social War did not seek independence but greater rights which 
they felt were long overdue. A number of Roman magistrates tapped into these concerns 
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in the decades prior to the war, and Roman victory in the Social War itself was, 
ironically, largely due to concessions made to the allies during the war. Florus’ grim 
analysis “though we call this war a war against allies, in order to diminish its abhorrence, 
if we are truthful, it was a war against citizens” might have been incorrect as far as legal 





That the distribution of newly enfranchised citizens remained a contentious issue 
for years after the Social War indicates that many Italians fully intended to utilize their 
new-found rights.
328
 This clearly indicates that the rebels in the Social War were not 
separatists but desired the same rights enjoyed by their Roman neighbors. Though the 
motivations behind the Italians’ desire for citizenship varied greatly over time, the desire 
still remained strong across multiple generations from the mid-second century to the 70’s. 
The Lex Iulia, the first major concession to the allies, was passed in 90, but the allies 
were not fully integrated until the census of 70.  
 Some rebels were hesitant to surrender but ultimately submitted to Rome after 
the passage of legislation such as the Lex Iulia and Lex Plautia Papiria. Others were 
willing to continue to fight and die until they knew for certain where they would stand in 
                                                          
327
 Flor. 2.18.1. 
328
 Dart 2014: 214. 
77 
 
Roman society. The low census of 86 clearly demonstrates that at least some of the allies 
believed that vague promises of enfranchisement meant little, and they competed for 
more concrete terms under Marius and Sulla. Eventually, the Romans gave the allies 
exactly what they wanted through subsequent legislation and censuses, but only after 
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